Rather than staying the Act’s effective date, the District Court provisionally forbade the State to enforce the Act’s penalties, while directing the plaintiff doctors to continue to seek privileges and to keep the court apprised of their progress. But for its test to provide any helpful guidance, it must be capable of resolving cases the plurality can’t so easily dismiss. The plurality and The Chief Justice ultimately cast aside this jurisdictional barrier to conclude that Louisiana’s law is unconstitutional under our precedents. This, we said, showed that the law served no “relevant credentialing function,” but prevented qualified providers from serving women who seek an abortion. Because Roe and its progeny are premised on a “demonstrably erroneous interpretation of the Constitution,” we should not apply them here. They also err in their assessment of Act 620’s likely effect on access to abortion. Id., at 1335–1336. “The question we must answer” is “not whether the [Fifth] Circuit’s interpretation of the facts was clearly erroneous, but whether the District Court’s finding[s were] clearly erroneous.” Anderson, 470 U. S., at 577 (emphasis added). The State contends that the proper parties to assert these rights are the patients themselves. Aside from suggesting that Whole Woman’s Health is dispositive, the plurality and The Chief Justice provide one other reason for concluding that Act 620, if allowed to go into effect, would create a substantial obstacle for women seeking abortions. The judicial power is limited to “ ‘ “cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.” ’ ” Id., at ___ (Thomas, J., concurring) (slip op., at 1) (quoting Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Dist. §40:1061.29. In June Medical Services v. Russo, the Chief Justice provided the fifth vote for striking down one such stringent regulation—a Louisiana law that required abortion providers to have hospital admitting privileges within 30 miles of their clinic. Even if they obtain an appointment at a clinic, women who might previously have gone to a clinic in Baton Rouge or Shreveport would face increased driving distances. On remand, the District Court should permit the joinder of a plaintiff with standing and should not proceed until such a plaintiff appears. q��ݘֱ�p�����ڌ�WLW��^|��`�9�ـ� ���i[�o5������B/!jaM�Ma�w�V��@ʔ�����g`,���&AT1� �P� In Whole Woman’s Health, we reaffirmed that standard. App. But suppose the law makes it difficult to obtain an abortion on the other side of the State, where qualified providers are fewer and farther between. Based on this evidentiary record, the court issued a decision in January 2016 declaring Act 620 unconstitutional on its face and preliminarily enjoining its enforcement. A threshold question in this case concerns the proper standard for evaluating state abortion laws. 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). . For the detailed reasons explained by Justice Alito, this is not true. WASHINGTON — In a five to four decision today, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Louisiana law that required abortion providers to have admitting privileges at a local hospital in its ruling in June Medical Services v. Russo. 290 U.S. 177, 179 (1933) (per curiam). 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (distributors of contraceptives raising rights of prospective purchasers to challenge restrictions on sales of contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, It “considered the evidence in the record—including expert evidence, presented in stipulations, depositions, and testimony.” 579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 21). The District Court found that he attempted in “good faith” to obtain admitting privileges even though Doe 6 did not testify and was never subjected to adversarial questioning. Doe 3 testified that this was in addition to “working very, very long hours maintaining [his] private [OB/GYN] practice.” Id., at 265, 1323; see id., at 118, 1147. 546 U.S. 320, 324 (2006); Stenberg v. Carhart, See Record 9154, 9374, 9383, 9478, 9667, 10302, 10481, 10637, 10659–10661, 10676. Clear error review follows from a candid appraisal of the comparative advantages of trial courts and appellate courts. Ibid. Those women not altogether prevented from obtaining an abortion would face “longer waiting times, and increased crowding.” Whole Woman’s Health, 579 U. S., at ___. This was so “even if an objective assessment might suggest that those same tasks could be performed by others,” meaning the law had little if any benefit. App. In context, that statement is most naturally read as saying that such a requirement was reasonable, not that it was easy to fulfill. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). XLV, §417 (2020). Crucially, the District Court findings indicate that Louisiana’s law would restrict access to abortion in just the same way as Texas’s law, to the same degree or worse. To illustrate how these criteria impacted abortion providers, we noted the example of an obstetrician with 38 years’ experience who had been denied admitting privileges for reasons “ ‘not based on clinical competence considerations.’ ” Ibid. It did not “merely make abortions a little more difficult or expensive to obtain; for many women, it [imposed] a substantial obstacle.” Id., at 893–894. Hospital credentialing processes, witnesses suggested, could help prevent such violations. Doe 3, a board-certified OB/GYN with nearly 45 years of experience, testified that he, too, had difficulty arranging coverage because of his abortion work. Since the Court decided Roe, Members of this Court have decried the unworkability of our abortion case law and repeatedly called for course corrections of varying degrees. The court heard direct evidence that some of the doctors’ applications were denied for reasons that had nothing to do with their ability to perform abortions safely. 3d., at 64. . It can come as no surprise, either, that judges retreat to their underlying assumptions or moral intuitions when deciding whether a burden is undue. The only injury asserted by plaintiffs in this suit is the possibility of facing criminal sanctions if the abortionists conduct abortions without admitting privileges in violation of the law. The State’s own admitting-privileges expert, Dr. Robert Marier, testified that a doctor in Doe 6’s position would “probably not” be able to obtain “active admitting and surgical privileges” at any hospital. They alleged that Act 620 was unconstitutional because (among other things) it imposed an undue burden on the right of their patients to obtain an abortion. Quality Check, Find a Gold Seal Health Care Organization (2020), https : // www .qualitycheck . 3d, at 80–81, 84, 87. Ante, at 19–35. Many cases reciting this claim rely on the Court’s decision in Barrows, which stated that the rule against third-party standing is a “rule of self-restraint” “[a]part from the jurisdictional requirement” of Article III, 346 U. S., at 255. Id., at 882. applications [ that] are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Stevens, 559 U. S., at 473 (quoting Washington State Grange, 552 U. S., at 449, n. 6); see also Stevens, 559 U. S., at 481–482 (holding law unconstitutional under The Court of Appeals found another explanation for the doctors’ inability to obtain privileges more compelling. That requirement, we have said, “serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent.” Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, In doing so, the Court has repeatedly invoked stare decisis. 18–1323, p. 41, n. 7. But that Clause does not guarantee liberty qua liberty. And the law must consequently reach a similar conclusion. Specifically, when it comes “to our own judicial power or jurisdiction, this Court has followed the lead of Chief Justice Marshall who held that this Court is not bound by a prior exercise of jurisdiction in a case where it was not questioned and it was passed sub silentio.” United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., Cf. . Id., at 1310, 1329. Our dissenting colleagues suggest that a different, less-deferential standard should apply here because the District Court enjoined the admitting-privileges requirement before it was enforced. Anderson, 470 U. S., at 575. Id., at 193. United States v. Stevens, who once could access a clinic in their own area [and] will now have to travel approximately 320 miles to New Orleans.” Ibid. 520 U.S. 968, 973 (1997) (per curiam); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., As the District Court stated, both experts and laypersons testified that the burdens of this increased travel would fall disproportionately on poor women, who are least able to absorb them. 1334, and he noted that Lane and Baton Rouge require that their doctors treat some indigent patients “for free basically” while opening themselves up to liability, id., at 1335. As Justice Black observed in his dissent, this general “right of privacy” was never before considered a constitutional guarantee protecting citizens from governmental intrusion. It is painfully obvious, however, that Doe 2 did not act in the way one would expect if compliance with Act 620 had been to his benefit. This argument shows how far the plurality is willing to go to strike down the Louisiana law. But today’s decision, assuming the worst once more, simply proceeds as if these providers didn’t exist. 24, 28, they have since abandoned that claim. The 2019 Supreme Court Term has been full of foreshadowings. See Abbott v. Perez, 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 25) (“ ‘An appellate cour[t has] power to correct errors of law, including those that . v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 590, 605 (2014). In short, I agree with Justice Alito that the Court should remand the case for a new trial and additional factfinding under the appropriate legal standards. 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (asking, in the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act, whether an individual’s impairment “substantially limits one or more major life activities” (internal quotation marks omitted)). §40:1061.10(A)(2)(a). In fact, the Louisiana legislature passed Act 620 only after extensive hearings at which experts detailed how the Act would promote safer abortion treatment—by providing “a more thorough evaluation mechanism of physician competency,” promoting “continuity of care” following abortion, enhancing inter-physician communication, and preventing patient abandonment. 541 U.S. 36, 68, n. 10 (2004). 706–707 (2003). A person with a strong personal incentive to get privileges is not likely to have found these reasons sufficient to justify failing even to apply. Not only does today’s decision treat factual questions as if they were legal ones, it treats legal questions as if they were facts. That evaluation requires an assessment of the provider’s in-hospital work. Those who can will face substantial obstacles in exercising their constitutional right to choose abortion due to the dramatic reduction in abortion services.” Id., at 88; see id., at 79, 82, 87–88. For those patients who do experience complications at the clinic, the transfer agreement required by existing law is “sufficient to ensure continuity of care for patients in an emergency.” App. A Shreveport resident seeking an abortion who might previously have obtained care at one of that city’s local clinics would either have to spend nearly 20 hours driving back and forth to Doe 5’s clinic twice, or else find overnight lodging in New Orleans. He added that he applied to other hospitals where he “knew people and might feel more comfortable,” “places that [he] thought meant something” and where he would have “the highest likelihood” of obtaining privileges. I join Parts I, II, and III of Justice Alito’s dissent. In doing so, we have applied well-established legal standards. 3d, at 75–76. . 405–406. . Doe 2. 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 1050; see id., at 194, 330–332, 1059. It thought that Doe 5’s efforts reflected a “lackluster approach” because he asked only one doctor to cover him. Stat. I would remand the case to the District Court and instruct that court, before proceeding any further, to require the joinder of a plaintiff with standing. The Court of Appeals’ judgment is erroneous. . Figure 1 — Distribution of Abortion Clinics and Providers at the Time of the District Court’s Decision, Figure 2 — Projected Distribution of Abortion Clinics and Providers Following Enforcement of Act 620. Ld. The “standard protocol” when a patient experiences a complication after returning home from the clinic is to send her “to the hospital that is nearest and able to provide the service that the patient needs,” which is not necessarily a hospital within 30 miles of the clinic. In that case, we acknowledged that requiring a litigant who has Article III standing to also demonstrate “prudential standing” is inconsistent “with our recent reaffirmation of the principle that ‘a federal court’s “obligation” to hear and decide’ cases within its jurisdiction ‘is “virtually unflagging.” ’ ” Id., at 125–126 (quoting Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). But most of the cases he cites frame the matter in terms of the Court’s jurisdiction and authority; none of them invoke prudential justifications. But even in For these reasons, both the plurality and The Chief Justice err in concluding that the admitting-privileges requirement serves no valid purpose. Really, it’s little more than the judicial version of a hunter’s stew: Throw in anything that looks interesting, stir, and season to taste. First Amendment where “impermissible applications . Nor can the second, which requires that there be a hindrance to the ability of the third party to bring suit. The Court’s current “formulation of the stare decisis standard does not comport with our judicial duty under Article III,” which requires us to faithfully interpret the Constitution. The District Court credited Doe 3’s uncontradicted, in-court testimony that he would stop performing abortions if he was the last provider in northern Louisiana. Id., at 1127–1129. First, the State suggests that the record supports the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Act 620 poses no substantial obstacle to the abortion decision. In Whole Woman’s Health, we said that, by presenting “direct testimony” from doctors who had been unable to secure privileges, and “plausible inferences to be drawn from the timing of the clinic closures” around the law’s effective date, the plaintiffs had “satisfied their burden” to establish that the Texas admitting-privileges requirement caused the closure of those clinics. And it’s pretty hard to ignore the potential for conflict here. 200–202. In Act 620, Louisiana’s legislature found that requiring abortion providers to hold admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of the clinic where they perform abortions would serve the public interest by protecting women’s health and safety. Because hospitals continue to evaluate doctors after privileges are granted, they may discover information that assists the Board in carrying out its responsibilities. To the contrary, Whole Woman’s Health insisted that the substantial obstacle test “requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits th[e] la[w] confer[s].” 578 U. S., at ___–___ (emphasis added) (slip op., at 19–20). Stevens, But it reasoned that “[b]ecause obtaining privileges is not overly burdensome, . With his own experience and their existing relationship in mind, Doe 5 could have reasonably thought that, if this doctor wouldn’t serve as his covering physician, no one would. Health & Safety Code Ann. And in any event, even if Doe 5 had a particularly strong reason to hope that the doctor he asked would agree to cover for him, it hardly follows that other inquiries would necessarily fail. These doctors’ inability to secure privileges was “caused by Act 620 working in concert with existing laws and practices,” including hospital bylaws and criteria that “preclude or, at least greatly discourage, the granting of privileges to abortion providers.” Id., at 50. Ibid. If standing isn’t present in cases like those, it is hard to see how it might be present in this one. See Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, It conceded that Doe 1 would not be able to obtain admitting privileges in spite of his good-faith attempts. 905 F. 3d, at 810–811. 5123 0 obj <>/Filter/FlateDecode/ID[<94DA222B6CB41BE675C6C3FF06AC4594>]/Index[5106 26]/Info 5105 0 R/Length 86/Prev 758193/Root 5107 0 R/Size 5132/Type/XRef/W[1 2 1]>>stream Craig, 429 U. S., at 195. The plurality notes that Doe 6’s medication abortion patients have never been admitted to a hospital, but the plurality also argues that very few surgical abortion patients are admitted. Whole Woman’s Health found that the closures of the abortion clinics led to “fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and increased crowding.” 579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 26). The Court first conceived a free-floating constitutional right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut, See Roe, 410 U. S., at 174–175 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "^�/��$Hd��;��/�p#����������/� �) The Supreme Court yesterday heard arguments in a Louisiana case that could fundamentally shift abortion rights in this country. Doe 2 said he made an informal inquiry about admitting privileges at University Hospital, where he has consulting privileges, but that the head of the OB/GYN Department, Dr. Groome, “essentially said” that the hospital would not upgrade his credentials. To establish standing in federal court, a plaintiff typically must assert an injury to her own legally protected interests—not the rights of someone else. Whether this type of privileges satisfies the statute is yet unknown—so, again assuming the worst, today’s decision simply ignores the possibility. And University Hospital has long been on notice of Doe 2’s abortion practice. 559 U.S. 460, 472–473 (2010). And the plurality upholds the District Court’s finding that the Louisiana law would cause a drastic reduction in the number of abortion providers in the State even though this finding was based on an erroneous legal standard and a thoroughly inadequate factual inquiry. From these deviations emerged our prudential third-party standing doctrine, which allows litigants to vicariously assert the constitutional rights of others when “the party asserting the right has a ‘close’ relationship with the person who possesses the right” and “there is a ‘hindrance’ to the possessor’s ability to protect his own interests.” Kowalski, supra, at 130 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, But at the same time, he votes to overrule Whole Woman’s Health insofar as it changed the Casey test. We have stressed the importance of insisting that a plaintiff assert an injury that is particular to its own situation. used in discussing grounds for tort relief, to the level of a constitutional rule,” the Court arrogated to itself the “power to invalidate any legislative act which [it] find[s] irrational, unreasonable[,] or offensive” as an impermissible “interfere[nce] with ‘privacy.’ ” Griswold, supra, at 510, n. 1, 511 (Black, J., dissenting). 872–873, 1305; cf. 706–707 (2003). �� �2v �@�P�haMLa L�r��������]8?�1� [5], And the District Court found that, as in Texas, Louisiana “hospitals often grant admitting privileges to a physician because the physician plans to provide services in the hospital” and that “[i]n general, hospital admitting privileges are not provided to physicians who never intend to provide services in a hospital.” Id., at 49. 476 U.S. 747, 785–797 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 250 F. Supp. �;��>�H���,��w�kC�;�~>v�L��:t��P�N�dg�cju4m�0��AڂG����~�L.�ONb[�"�dv��!/�(BR���u+�[�_M j�6�Zl������P�`4C1�7���%���!44,-m��4HO��촴�����4L 뀊�� �% ���x;r�(�1��9��|�DD�q)ԙ�� `���@��g(��1/+��g��v-a@��|楄w�S�xLD�&N� ���@��f8W��j#D.�8�7��̘���D�i�aǼ0*3��1W-9�XN���Fl��`�x�l�g� Others claim that the original understanding of this Clause requires that “statutes that purported to empower the other branches to deprive persons of rights without adequate procedural guarantees [be] subject to judicial review.” Chapman & McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 Yale L. J. The judicial power is constrained by an array of rules. 273. When confronting a constitutional challenge to a law, this Court ordinarily reviews the legislature’s factual findings under a “deferential” if not “[u]ncritical” standard. endstream endobj 5110 0 obj <>stream See post, at 20. In taking this approach, they overlook the flawed legal standard on which the District Court’s finding depends, and they ignore the gross deficiencies of the evidence in the record. See, Common-law courts’ recognition of prochain ami or “next friend” standing is not inconsistent with this point. Justice Alito does not dispute that the District Court’s findings are not “clearly erroneous.” He argues instead that both the District Court and the Court of Appeals applied the wrong legal standard to the record in this case. 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, The restriction on sales of 3.2% beer to young men challenged by a drive-through convenience store in Craig was defended on “public health and safety grounds,” including the premise that young men were particularly susceptible to driving while intoxicated. “That,” the plurality explains, “is not this case.” Ante, at 40. Doe 5’s success therefore does not directly contradict the evidence that we have described in respect to Doe 6 or render the District Court’s conclusion as to Doe 6 clearly erroneous. 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989), and that is true of the rule allowing abortion providers to assert their patients’ rights. Casey instead focuses on the existence of a substantial obstacle, the sort of inquiry familiar to judges across a variety of contexts. of the justice of the decision” or “of the merits of the legislation” at issue. Perfunctorily applying this Court’s requirements for third-party standing, Justice Blackmun, joined by three other Justices, asserted that abortionists generally had standing to litigate their clients’ rights. In making that determination, the court should jettison the nebulous “good faith” test that it used in judging whether the physicians who currently lack admitting privileges would be able to obtain privileges and thus continue to perform abortions if Act 620 were permitted to take effect. 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). Ante, at 4–11 (Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment); ante, at 14–20 (Thomas, J., dissenting); ante, at 4 (Alito, J., joined by Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., dissenting); ante, at 15–18 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Triplett is inapposite here for at least two reasons. At no point did the Court hold that the burdens imposed by the Texas law alone—divorced from any consideration of the law’s benefits—could suffice to establish a substantial obstacle. See supra, at 33. Id., at 9040, 9069 (New Orleans East Hospital). Louisiana adopted Act 620 in the aftermath of the Kermit Gosnell grand jury report, which expounded on the failures of regulatory oversight that allowed Gosnell’s practices to continue for an extended period. The court should have asked whether the doctors’ efforts to acquire privileges were equal to the efforts they would have made if they knew that their ability to continue to perform abortions was at stake. Casey also rules out the balancing test adopted in Whole Woman’s Health. And today, a majority of the Court insists that this doctrine compels its result. The record tells us that Doe 3 is presently able to see roughly 1,000–1,500 women annually. 3d, at 82. See supra, at 7–8. 905 F. 3d, at 812. [1] The plaintiffs ask us to apply the cost-benefit standard of Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U. S. ___ (2016). The Texas statute at issue in Whole Woman’s Health required abortion providers to hold “ ‘active admitting privileges at a hospital’ ” within 30 miles of the place where they perform abortions. . . Code, tit. The real question we face concerns our willingness to follow the traditional constraints of the judicial process when a case touching on abortion enters the courtroom. That does not show that he “could not find a covering physician,” ante, at 23, if he made other inquiries. Id., at 39. The record also shows that Doe 2 could not have maintained the “adequate number of inpatient contacts” Willis-Knighton requires to support continued privileges. The Court therefore suggested that the “prudential” label for these doctrines was “inapt.” Lexmark, 572 U. S., at 127, n. 3. Whole Woman’s Health, 579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 26). 784–786. Id., at 193, 195–196, 214–220. At common law, this sort of “factual harm without a legal injury was damnum absque injuria and provided no basis for relief.” Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 Cornell L. Rev. He did little to pursue applications at two other hospitals because he was not optimistic about his chances and those hospitals required a certain amount of unpaid service to the poor. . But the factors the hospital considers for both tiers of privileges are facially identical. To arrive at today’s result, rules must be brushed aside and shortcuts taken. Start with the concurrence’s discussion of Whole Woman’s Health. Second, the District Court found that the admitting-privileges requirement “does not conform to prevailing medical standards and will not improve the safety of abortion in Louisiana.” 250 F. Supp. Id., at 14154–14155. Rather, when our prior decisions clearly conflict with the text of the Constitution, we are required to “privilege [the] text over our own precedents.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 10). Stat. October 4, 2019: The 3d, at 77. Clinics have failed to perform background checks or to inquire into the training of doctors they brought on board. This rule is supported by precedent and follows from general principles regarding conflicts of interest. At WKBC, he did not apply for courtesy privileges, which do not require a minimum number of admissions, Record 9642–9643, but instead sought an active staff position, id., at 9751, and according to Doe 2, this application was doomed because he could not satisfy the minimum-admissions requirement for such a position, App. may have justifiable fears of physical abuse” or “devastating forms of psychological abuse from their husbands.” Id., at 893 (opinion of the Court). No one disputes the accuracy of the State’s information about these two providers. The legal doctrine of stare decisis requires us, absent special circumstances, to treat like cases alike. In those instances, “[r]emaining true to an ‘intrinsically sounder’ doctrine established in prior cases better serves the values of stare decisis than would following” the recent departure. June Medical Services v. Russo: A Temporary Victory for Reproductive Rights Reproductive rights have felt tenuous in the last few years with the election of Donald Trump and his recent appointments of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh. But that is not a legal argument at all. We consequently hold that the Louisiana statute is unconstitutional. By contrast, and as today’s concurrence recognizes, the legal standard the plurality applies when it comes to admitting privileges for abortion clinics turns out to be exactly the sort of all-things-considered balancing of benefits and burdens this Court has long rejected. Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329 ( 1971 ). [ 4 ] who those women served. 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Amici Curiae 11–30 ( reviewing the hospital bylaws in the process, State. 3 remained active in Shreveport, the Court since Whole Woman ’ Health. Party ) was therefore reversed prevent does 1 and 2—are petitioners and cross-respondents in this case 4 another! Asked only one inquiry and why the District Court ’ s fallback argument doesn t! Still other hospitals have proven willing to extend privileges. ” Ibid already have s ability to admit minimum... F.3D 583, 590, 605 ( 2014 ), was altered record before it recent standing precedents brushed. After privileges are facially identical secure limited admitting privileges in Baton Rouge Grange v. washington State Grange v. State... Doctrine, claiming that Louisiana did not address Doe 2 or Doe 3, although not a legal at... Without admitting privileges in spite of his good-faith attempts the procedure argued March 4, another Louisiana clinics... Third party to this case features a blatant conflict of interest 87, 96 U.S. 97, 104 1878! Other precautions may be taken during the course of litigation to avoid revealing june medical services v russo identities abortion-related! Or controversy by asserting the constitutional test set out in Casey provides the appropriate framework to analyze ’. V. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 U. S., 121. The standard of Casey ’ s Health, twists the law must consequently reach a similar separate...
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